The Effects of Decoupling on Land Allocation by Serra, Teresa et al.
www.ssoar.info
The Effects of Decoupling on Land Allocation
Serra, Teresa; Zilberman, David; Gil, José M.; Featherstone, Allen M
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Serra, T., Zilberman, D., Gil, J. M., & Featherstone, A. M. (2009). The Effects of Decoupling on Land Allocation.
Applied Economics, 41(18), 2323-2333. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840701222520
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-241088
For Peer Review
The Effects of Decoupling on Land Allocation 
Journal: Applied Economics 
Manuscript ID: APE-06-0188.R1 
Journal Selection: Applied Economics 
JEL Code:
D21 - Firm Behavior < D2 - Production and Organizations < D - 
Microeconomics, Q18 - Agricultural Policy|Food Policy < Q1 - 
Agriculture < Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Q12 
- Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input 
Markets < Q1 - Agriculture < Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource 
Economics, D80 - General < D8 - Information and Uncertainty < D 
- Microeconomics 
Keywords: risk, risk preferences, land allocation 
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
For Peer Review
Responses to referee1
APE 06-0188
1
RESPONSES TO REFEREE 1
APE-06-0188
THE EFFECTS OF DECOUPLING ON LAND ALLOCATION
We are very grateful for your careful review of the paper and your helpful comments and suggestions. 
We believe that the revisions suggested by your review have significantly improved the manuscript. 
While hoping that we have been able to address your concerns, we stand ready to make any 
additional changes that you deem necessary.
We proceed to respond to your comments below.
General Comments
This is a good paper on an important topic. It is well-written and the analysis appears to have 
been competently executed. The paper falls down in several places in terms of its exposition 
and needs significant revision (see my comments below).
Specific Comments
(1) (page 1) You need to break this paragraph-it runs on here.
The paragraph has been rewritten as suggested.
(2) (page 2) As you correctly note later in the paper, it is not risk neutrality that is the common 
assumption but rather DARA preferences.
Thank you for pointing out this issue. We have removed the statement that the conventional 
approach to the analysis of the effects of agricultural policies on farmers’ decisions has assumed 
perfect markets, risk neutral producers and constant returns to scale (see the first paragraph in page 
2). This approach has been simply presented as a feasible method. In the same paragraph we now 
also note that it has been common for policy analyses to assume aversion to risk. 
(3) (page 3) Again, you provide an explicit comparison below-but farmers are a wealthy lot and 
thus the expectation would be for small effects, even with strongly DARA preferences.
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We completely agree with this referee comment, and have incorporated this in the main text (see last 
paragraph in page 3).
(4) (page 3) Instead of saying “actual production," you should note that it is current 
production that matters.
We have replaced “actual” by “current.” Thanks for your detailed review. 
(5) (page 5) Here, and in other places in the paper, you refer to “ risk adversity" when you 
mean “risk aversion."
The words “adversity” and “adverse” have been replaced by “aversion” and “averse” respectively. We 
appreciate your patience in correcting our errors.
(6) (page 7) You refer to idled land here and later in the analysis-how does the CRP program 
factor into land idling?
Your point is a very interesting one and we recognize we should have made it clear from the 
beginning. As we now note in footnote 6 in page 7, the CRP does not affect our results. This is due to 
data collection methods. Specifically, the CRP does not factor into the land idling of the Kansas 
dataset and it is handled separately. Since the CRP consists of long-term contracts that promote the 
establishment of conserving covers on highly erodible land, it precludes adapting land use to 
changing market conditions and policy regulations. Therefore, it has not been incorporated into the 
idle land definition made in our paper. Thanks for noting this issue and allowing us to clarify it.
(7) (page 12) Are you assuming constant yields and land quality across an agent's land 
holdings? What about the role of crop rotations?
Your questions are important. You are right in noting that land quality is assumed to be constant 
across an agent’s land holdings. We would like to note here that our empirical application is 
necessarily constrained by data availability. The collection of information on how land quality varies 
across different plots would allow us to assess the influence of land quality on land allocation 
decisions. Such information could be easily incorporated in our theoretical model by respecifying the 
production function (see footnote 4 on page 6). Allowing for changes in land quality across an agent’s 
plots would probably confirm the well-known practice that farmers follow to set aside the land with the 
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lowest quality and productively use the more fertile plots. We have added this discussion in our 
paper, both in footnote number 4 in page 6, and on the concluding remarks section. 
We also agree that crop rotation issues might be relevant and represent another factor affecting land 
use decisions. Crop rotation is a reason for diversification and affects the relative profitability of a 
crop at a given field because of soil dynamics. Farmers being aware of this can establish constraints 
on land use patterns. Crop rotation can occur between program crops or between program and non-
program commodities. Since program crops are grouped under a single output category, only inter-
group rotation would affect our results. Unfortunately our database does not contain information on 
agronomic issues. As a result, crop rotation cannot be explicitly modelled, though it is implicitly 
accounted for. Were data available, agronomic restrictions could easily be introduced in the model by 
solving a constrained optimization problem. It is also true however, that rotation constraints did not 
change with policy reforms and, from this perspective, the effects of not explicitly modelling crop 
rotation should not be very relevant for our policy analysis. 
The value of crop rotation might have changed with policy reforms. On the one hand, pre-reform 
coupled payments to program crops not allowing to put land to other agricultural uses, are very likely 
to have reduced the value of rotating non-program with program commodities. With the decoupling of 
payments and the allowance of planting flexibility, farmers are likely to have been more willing to 
rotate program with non-program crops. On the other hand, however, the reform-induced reduction in 
price supports to program crops is likely to have cut down the value of planting non-program crops for 
rotation purposes. This is because any extra yields in program crops obtained as a result of rotation 
will now have a lower market value. As a result, the overall impact of crop rotation is not very likely to 
have been relevant. We add this discussion in the conceptual framework section in our model (see 
pages 10 and 11). A discussion of the consequences of crop rotation for land use in Kansas is 
offered in the empirical application section (see pages 17 and 18).
(8) (page 13) It is not clear here if you are discarding a lot of data in order to balance the panel. 
If so, are you not worried about sample selection bias?
Our dataset does not offer information on PFC payments separate from other government payments, 
which constitute a central issue in our analysis. As a result, a method to estimate such payments was 
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devised. Since data on PFC payment rates are available from the USDA, an estimation of the farm-
level payments can be derived by approximating the base acreage and yield for each crop and farm. 
This requires to concentrate on those farms that have remained in the dataset long enough to allow a 
good estimation of the bases (we use the 1986-88 data for such purpose). The selection of these 
farms involves being left with 560 observations per year, while the incomplete panel would have had, 
on average, 1950 farms per year. Discarding observations, however, does not substantially alter the 
data means (see the table below).
Table 1. Means for the variables of interest
Variable Balanced panel 
(n= 2,241)
Unbalanced 
panel (n = 7824)
1y  (USD/acre). Program crop yields 106.54 106.40 
2y  (USD/acre). Non-program crop yields  118.74 116.25 
1x  (USD/acre). Variable input allocated to 1y 39.32 38.03 
2x  (USD/acre). Variable input allocated to 2y 28.17 29.39
1p (1998=1.00). Program crop price index 1.01 1.01
2p (1998=1.00). Non-program crop price index 0.91 0.91
w  (1998=100). Variable input price index  1.02 1.02
1  (USD/acre). Program crop quasi rents  67.55 68.39
2  (USD/acre). Non-program crop quasi rents 79.61 75.76
1var( ) Variance of program crop quasi rents  180.81 172.16
2var( ) Variance of non-program crop quasi 
rents
861.61 654.73
Note: all monetary values are expressed in constant 1998 currency units
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Table 1. Means for the variables of interest (continued)
Variable Balanced panel
(n= 2,241)
Unbalanced 
panel (n = 7824)
1 2cov( )   Quasi rents’ covariance 268.39 307.28
0W  (USD). Farm’s initial wealth 669,663.10 555,070.64
1L  Proportion of land allocated to 1y 0.62 0.65
2L  Proportion of land allocated to 2y 0.26 0.24
3L  Proportion of land left idle 0.12 0.12
A  (acres). Total crop land 1075.90 1092.76
Note: all monetary values are expressed in constant 1998 currency units
(9) (page 14) You should briefly discuss the implications of the “behavioral method."
Thanks for emphasizing the need to provide further detail of the behavioral approach which may not 
be well known by readers. We have done so on page 16, where we clarify that this approach is based 
upon the assumption that farmers behave as if production is characterized by constant returns to 
scale with fixed input/land ratios. These fixed proportions are assumed to be based on regional 
averages, though allowing for modifications for seasonal and farm-specific conditions. We also note 
that the implementation of the behavioral approach requires data which are generally available (land 
allocation by crop, purchases by input and sales by output). Finally, we emphasize that Just et al. 
(1990) show the validity of the behavioral approach and its superiority relative to other alternative 
approaches such as the profit maximization method. 
(10) (page 15) Again, the role of crop rotations should be considered here.
As we explain in the response to your comment number 7, in the empirical application section, pages
17 and 18, we discuss the likely impacts of crop rotation issues on Kansas land use. We fully agree 
with this referee that the implications of agronomic restrictions for land use had to be considered. 
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(11) (page 16) You need to provide a better definition of your variables (in Table 1). It is almost 
impossible to understand the empirical specification.
Following your suggestion, table 1 now incorporates a brief definition of our variables, so that it is 
easier to follow the empirical specification. Details on the units of measure of the variables are also 
given. 
(12) (page 16) You should also provide an explicit presentation of the exact empirical 
specification that you are estimating. This should be shown in terms of the EU function.
On page 19, we offer the exact empirical specification that is estimated in our empirical application as 
requested.
(13) (page 17) You refer to “market prices" here when I think you are referring to deficiency 
payment supports.
Thank you for your careful review, we have substituted “market prices” by “deficiency payments.”
(14) (page 18) You should mention the role of expectations about future policy benefits as a 
factor influencing production.
The role of expectations about future policy benefits has been mentioned as a factor that may 
influence production. Specifically, in the concluding remarks section, we recognize the limitations of 
our research and consider the analysis of the effects of expectations on land use as a possible 
avenue for future research.
(15) (page 18) I do not fully understand your characterization of set-asides as “self-insurance."
This referee is right in pointing out that characterizing set-asides as a form of “self-insurance” was, at 
least, confusing and we have removed the sentence from the text. 
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(16) (page 18) It would help your exposition to provide a simulation of policy changes on 
production.
Your suggestion of including a simulation of policy changes is certainly useful. We have done so in 
the last paragraph of the results section, where we simulate the impacts of the policy changes 
occurred during the period studied on land use. 
Again, we thank you for your useful review.
References:
Just, R.E., Zilberman, D., Hochman, E., and Bar-Shira, Z. (1990) Input Allocation in Multicrop 
Systems, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 72, 200-209.
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________________________________________________________________________ 
Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to study the impact of agricultural policy decoupling on land 
allocation decisions. Our analysis contributes to the literature by formally assessing the effects of 
decoupling on farms’ crop mix and on the decision to set land aside. The analysis is undertaken 
within the framework of the model of production under uncertainty developed by Just and 
Zilberman (1986). Our empirical application focuses on a sample of Kansas farms observed from 
1998 to 2001. Results show that US agricultural policy decoupling has resulted in a shift in land 
use away from program crops towards non-program commodities offering higher expected profits 
and idle land. 
Keywords: risk, risk preferences, land allocation 
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THE EFFECTS OF DECOUPLING ON LAND ALLOCATION 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to study the impact of agricultural policy decoupling on land 
allocation decisions. Our analysis contributes to the literature by formally assessing the effects of 
decoupling on farms’ crop mix and on the decision to set land aside. The analysis is undertaken 
within the framework of the model of production under uncertainty developed by Just and 
Zilberman (1986). Our empirical application focuses on a sample of Kansas farms observed from 
1998 to 2001. Results show that US agricultural policy decoupling could have involved a shift in 
land use away from program crops towards non-program commodities offering higher expected 
profits and idle land. 
Keywords: risk, risk preferences, land allocation 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Until recently, the design of domestic agricultural policies in developed countries 
has given priority to methods that guarantee a price floor for agricultural 
commodities. Price support mechanisms can range from supply restrictions 
imposed on the domestic market, price subsidies, or public purchases of 
agricultural commodities to offset excess supply. A wide literature has shown 
that price support mechanisms may intensify production practices and bring 
about significant deadweight losses (Gardner, 1992).  
The unfavourable consequences of agricultural protectionism became 
widely recognized by the 1980s. It became clear that agricultural intervention 
based on price guarantees and other market insulating policies led to 
overproduction, which in turn brought about market distortions and 
disagreements in multilateral trade policy negotiations. Recognition of these 
problems motivated multilateral and/or bilateral trade agreements that advocated 
for agricultural protectionism dismantling processes. In the framework of these 
agreements, different countries have reformed their domestic agricultural 
policies.  
Economic theory views lump sum transfers as the most efficient method 
to redistribute income among individuals (Williamson, 1996). The trade-off 
between political pressures for continued support to farmers and the 
policymakers’ will to reduce efficiency losses resulted in an increased use of 
decoupled agricultural policies. Decoupling is a term used to designate the break 
of the link between subsidies and production. Price supports are usually replaced 
by lump sum income transfers that do not depend on current production or prices.  
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Several methodologies to assess the effects of agricultural policies on 
farmers’ profit maximization decisions have been used. A feasible approach 
consists of assuming perfect markets (including credit markets), risk neutral 
producers and constant returns to scale. Under these assumptions, the literature 
has shown that the impacts of decoupled policies on production decisions are 
limited. However, if economic agents are not risk neutral, markets are imperfect, 
or returns to scale are other than constant, apparently decoupled payments could 
have more implications (see Phimister, 1995; Hennessy, 1998; or Rude, 2001). A 
number of studies that have assessed economic agents’ risk preferences using 
different methods have found evidence in favour of risk aversion (see, for 
example, Hansen and Singleton, 1983; Chavas and Pope, 1985; Pope and Just, 
1991; Abdulkadri, Langemeier and Featherstone, 2003 and 2006; or Wik et at., 
2004). In light of these findings, it has been common for policy analyses to 
assume aversion to risk.1 If uncertainty and risk preferences are introduced in the 
analysis of the impacts of decoupling, results suggest that apparently decoupled 
policies can influence production decisions (Hennessy, 1998; Sandmo, 1971). It 
is thus very important to account for risk and risk preferences when assessing the 
effects of decoupling.  
When coupled or partially coupled, income supports often involve 
restrictive supply management rules that limit farmers’ capacity to respond to 
market conditions. For example, eligibility for public subsidies is usually made 
 
1 The role of risk has also been considered when assessing farmer decisions other than strict profit 
maximization decisions. Key, Roberts and O’Donoghue (2006), for example, analyze the impacts 
of risk on farm operators’ off-farm labor supply. In another line of inquiry, Abdulkadri, 
Langemeier and Featherstone (2006) study the impacts of excluding risk and risk preferences on 
cost structures. 
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conditional upon producing specific crops, the program crops. In this regard, 
decoupling involves increased planting flexibility in that direct payments are not 
tied to the production of certain commodities. Farmers being allowed more 
planting flexibility are likely to be more responsive to market conditions and 
alter their crop mix accordingly. To the extent that planting flexibility includes 
the possibility of agricultural land idling, farmers will also consider setting land 
aside when making their decisions on land allocation.  
There are other mechanisms through which the decoupling of agricultural 
policies can influence land allocation decisions. These mechanisms are the 
changes in relative market prices and farmers’ risk attitudes. The reduction in 
price supports is likely to make program crops less attractive relative to non-
program commodities and land idling. Also, to the extent that farmers’ risk 
preferences are influenced by wealth (Sandmo, 1971; Just and Pope, 1978; 
Hennessy, 1998; Just and Zilberman, 1986) and to the extent that decoupled 
payments and price changes have the potential to affect the wealth of participant 
farmers, their willingness to assume risk may be altered. Because risk is a 
fundamental component of agricultural production and because yield variability 
can differ by crop type, government transfers might affect farms’ land use by 
means of altering farmers’ risk attitudes. To the extent that farmers are wealthy 
and decoupled payments only represent a small proportion of their wealth,2 one 
should expect small wealth effects from decoupled payments, even if farmers 
display strongly decreasing absolute risk aversion.3
2 In the sample of Kansas farms utilized in the empirical application, decoupled government 
payments represent less than 2% of farmers’ wealth (see the results section for more detail). 
3 An anonymous Journal reviewer raised this issue. 
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Decoupled agricultural payments were introduced in the United States 
(US) with the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act, 
which involved a substantial change in the way income support was provided to 
farmers. With the FAIR Act, market price supports and deficiency payments 
were being partially replaced by Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) Payments 
whose amount and entitlement would not depend on current production or prices, 
and a deficiency payment program that guaranteed a minimum support price for 
program crops including soybeans. Under the 1990 Act, with the exception of the 
flex acres, producers were required to plant the base acreage to the base crop in 
order to be eligible for deficiency payments. Entitlement to receive PFC was 
based on qualified acres historically enrolled in commodity programs, allowing 
land to be put to any agricultural use, including the production of any crop with 
the exception of fruits and vegetables (unless it was used in this way in the past), 
or idled.   
The purpose of this article is to study the impacts of decoupling on land 
allocation decisions. Our analysis contributes to the literature by formally 
assessing the effects of decoupling on farms’ crop mix and on the decision to set 
land aside. The analysis is undertaken within the framework of a model of 
production under uncertainty developed by Just and Zilberman (1986). We 
extend this model to study supply responses to decoupled payments and to 
include set aside among land use alternatives. Though various analyses have 
addressed the effects of decoupling on producers’ decisions, no existing research 
has studied the impacts of decoupled payments on farms’ land allocation using 
the extended Just and Zilberman (1986) model. Our empirical application 
focuses on a sample of Kansas farms observed from 1998 to 2001. Results 
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suggest that US agricultural policy decoupling may result in a shift in land use 
away from program crops towards non-program commodities offering higher 
expected profits and idle land.  
 
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The objective of our model is to assess the effects of decoupling on farm land 
allocation. We adopt the Just and Zilberman (1986) model of production under 
uncertainty. Because agricultural producers are not likely to be neutral to risk, 
farmers’ risk preferences are explicitly considered. Our model defines risk 
preferences as a function of wealth (Just and Zilberman, 1986; Pope and Just, 
1991; Hennessy, 1998). If economic agents are risk averse and their risk aversion 
decreases with wealth (Pope and Just, 1991; Bar-Shira, Just and Zilberman, 
1997), an increase in decoupled payments is expected to alter the crop mix 
towards more risky crops that offer higher expected margins. The reduction in 
price supports for program crops that characterizes a decoupling process will 
reduce the attractiveness of these crops in favour of non-program commodities 
and/or idle land. Apart from the substitution effects, a change in output prices 
will also have an income effect that, under the assumption of decreasing absolute 
risk averse (DARA) preferences, is likely to increase risk aversion. 
The 1996 FAIR Act involved the introduction of decoupled payments that 
allowed, with some restrictions, full planting flexibility. We extend the Just and 
Zilberman (1986) model to allow for these payments and the possibility to 
receive them even if agricultural land is left idle. Our model offers an improved 
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6
picture of farmers’ behaviour by re-optimizing land allocation in response to 
policy. We model PFC payments as simple lump sum transfers, thus recognizing 
that under the new scenario farmers manage their crop mix in accordance with 
market conditions.  
 Consider a farm that produces two outputs, crop 1 and crop 2. Crop 1 
represents a program crop where eligibility for government payments under the 
old policy regime required crop acres be planted to this crop. Crop 2 is a non-
program crop. Yields per acre are defined as uncertain variables and expressed as 
1 2( , )y y=Y . For simplicity, it is assumed that producer uncertainty derives only 
from production, but not from market conditions. If additive production risk is 
assumed, the production function4 of crop i can be expressed as ( )i i i iy y x = + ,
where ix is the per acre quantity of a variable input x allocated to the production 
of crop i , and i is a stochastic error term with mean [ ] 0iE  = and variance 
[ ] 2var i i = . The first two moments of the joint distribution of yields are 
denoted by 1 1
2 2
y y
E
y y
   
=	 
 	 

   
and 
2
1 1 1 2
2
2 1 2 2
cov
y
y
  
  
  
= 	 
	 

   
, where 
represents the correlation coefficient among the two crop yields. The quasi rents 
derived from crop i are expressed on a per acre basis as i i i ip y wx =  , where 
 
4 Our empirical application is necessarily constrained by data availability. The collection of 
information on how land quality varies across an agent’s land holdings would allow to assess the 
influence of land quality on land allocation decisions. Such information could be easily 
incorporated in our model by respecifying the production function: ( , )ij ij ij ij ijy y x  = + , where 
ij would represent land quality in plot j of firm i . Allowing for changes in land quality across 
an agent’s plots would probably confirm the well known practice that farmers follow to set aside 
the land with the lowest quality and productively use the more fertile plots. 
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7
ip represents crop i price and w is the variable input price, being the first two 
moments of the joint distribution of quasi rents 1 1
2 2
E
   
= 	 
	 
    
and 
2
1 1 1 2
2
2 1 2 2
cov
  
  
   
= 	 
	 
   
, where i i ip = .
Total crop land ( )A 5 is allocated to the production of the two crops 
considered or left idle6 yielding the following vector of land allocation: 
( )1 2 3, ,A A A=A , where 1 2 3A A A A= + + , 3A represents idle land and 1A and 2A
symbolize land allocated to program and non-program crops respectively. The 
problem of land allocation can alternatively be expressed in proportions as 
( )1 2 3, ,L L L=L , where ii
AL
A
= and 1 2 3 1+ + =L L L .
It is assumed that farmers make their decisions with the aim of 
maximizing the expected utility of  their wealth [ ]
1 2 3 1 2, , , ,
max ( )
L L L x x
E u W =
( )
1 3 1 2
0 1 1 2 1 3, , ,
max (1 )+ + +    L L x x E u W G AL A L L
, where W represents farms’ total 
wealth, 0W stands for farms’ initial wealth, and G are decoupled income-support 
payments.  The quasi rent associated to idle land is assumed to be equal to zero. 
 
5 Because, for our sample of farms, crop land remained almost constant during the period of 
analysis, A is assumed to be fixed. 
6 The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) does not factor into the land idling consideration of 
this paper. Since it consists of long-term contracts that promote the establishment of conserving 
covers on environmentally sensitive cropland, it precludes adapting land use to changing market 
conditions or policy regulations. 
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8
Following previous literature, we assume risk neutrality in the input decision7
which leads to independence of land allocation from variable input decisions 
(Just and Zilberman, 1986). Under this assumption the first order conditions of 
the land allocation problem can be expressed as:  
 
[ ] ( )1 2
1
0
  =   	 
  
E u uE
L W
 (1.1) 
[ ] ( )2
3
0
  =  	 
  
E u uE
L W
 (1.2) 
 
By approximating the marginal utility around the expected wealth 
( )0 1 1 2 1 3(1 )= + + +  W W G AL A L L through a second-order Taylor series 
expansion, the first order conditions can be alternatively expressed as: 
 
( ) { }1 2 1 1 3 2(1 ) 0 
 
 +  R L L
A
(2.1) 
{ }2 1 2 3 3( ) (1 ) 0 

  +  R L L
A
(2.2) 
 
where 
12
2( )
   = =      
u uR R W
W W
 represents the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion.  Following Bar-Shira, Just and Zilberman (1997) we 
 
7 As Just and Zilberman note, the assumption of risk neutrality is very common in models with 
stochastic production and is necessary for the dual cost and production functions to be 
independent of risk preferences. This assumption allows to derive a theoretical framework that is 
more tractable at the empirical level. 
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9
assume R to be a function of farms’ expected wealth that can be represented by 
R W  = , where  and  are parameters that represent a farmer’s risk 
preferences. This is a flexible specification in that it does not restrict the specific 
type of farmers’ risk preferences. Risk averse (neutral) [seeking] attitudes are 
represented by ( )[ ]0 > = < . We assume farmers to be risk-averse ( > 0 ). The 
wealth elasticity of absolute risk aversion corresponds to  . If farmers have 
decreasing (constant) [increasing] absolute risk aversion preferences, 
( )[ ]0 > = < . In accord with previous studies (Bar-Shira, Just and Zilberman, 
1997; Isik and Khanna, 2003; Eisenhauer and Ventura, 2003) we assume here 
that farmers have DARA preferences ( < 0 ). The expression 
1 =v
2 2
1 1 2 22    +
1
var 0T
L
 
= >  
 is the variance of the marginal profit 
derived from increasing land allocated to crop 1i = and 
1 1 1 3 2(1 ) =  +   T L L L . The result of multiplying 2v
2
1 2 2  =  by 
3(1 ) L is 
1
var1
2
 

T
L
, which represents one-half the marginal variance of profit 
when 1 0L = , i.e. at zero capacity allocation. Finally, 
2
3 2= v corresponds to 
the negative value of the variance of non-program crop quasi rents. Note that 
expressions (2.1) and (2.2) above involve the equalization of the marginal mean 
income effect derived from an increase in land allocated to crop i and the 
marginal risk effect discounted to a certainty equivalent using the Arrow-Pratt 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion. 
 In order to determine the effects of decoupling on land allocation 
decisions, we use comparative statics. The consideration of a multi-product land 
allocation problem involves substantial complexity relative to a more simplified 
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10
two-product model and yields comparative statics formulae that cannot be 
signed. In order to make comparative statics more simple, but also more clear, 
we simplify the model to a consideration of only two alternatives in the land 
allocation problem: 1L and iL , 2,3i = .
8 It is important to note that model 
simplification is only limited to the comparative statics analysis in this section, 
and that the empirical implementation will be based upon the generalized three-
product model.  
 Crop rotation issues might be relevant and represent a factor affecting 
land use decisions other than economic and political reasons.9 Crop rotation is a 
reason for diversification and affects the relative profitability of a crop at a given 
field because of soil dynamics. Farmers being aware of this, can establish 
constraints on land use patterns. Crop rotation can occur between program crops 
or between program and non-program crops. Since program crops are grouped 
under a single output category, only the inter-group rotation would affect our 
results. Unfortunately, our database does not contain information on agronomic 
issues. As a result, crop rotation cannot be explicitly modelled, though it is 
implicitly accounted for. Were data available, agronomic restrictions could easily 
be introduced in the model by solving a constrained optimization problem. It is 
also true however, that rotation constraints did not change with policy reforms 
and, from this perspective, the effects of not explicitly modelling crop rotation 
should not be very relevant for our policy analysis.  
 
8 Note that this simplification is economically reasonable as it represents two possible corner 
solutions that can apply to our problem, i.e. that farmers decide not to set land aside or diversify 
the crop mix. 
9 This was suggested by an anonymous Journal reviewer. 
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The value of crop rotation might have changed with policy reforms. On 
the one hand, pre-reform coupled payments to program crops not allowing to put 
land to other agricultural uses, are very likely to have reduced the value of 
rotating non-program with program commodities. With the decoupling of 
payments and the allowance of planting flexibility, farmers are likely to have 
been more willing to rotate program with non-program commodities. On the 
other hand, however, the reform-induced reduction in price supports to program 
crops is likely to have cut down the value of planting non-program crops for 
rotation purposes. This is because any extra yields in program crops obtained as a 
result of rotation will now have a lower market value. As a result, the overall 
impact of crop rotation is not very likely to have been relevant. A discussion of 
the consequences of crop rotation for land use in Kansas is offered in the 
empirical application section. 
 Let’s consider a land allocation problem that only includes program and 
non-program commodities. In such a scenario, the system of first-order 
conditions is reduced to: 
 
( ) { }1 2 1 1 2 0 
 
 + =R L
A
(3) 
 
where 1
1
var
 
=   
T
L
, 2
1
var1
2
  =

T
L
, and 1 1 1 2(1 ) =  +  T L L . As 
explained above, in a decoupling process lump sum payments are usually 
introduced to replace price supports. Our comparative statics analysis thus 
focuses on determining the sensitivity of the crop mix to changes to program 
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12
crop prices and to lump sum payments. The comparative statics results can be 
summarized in the following propositions (proofs are presented in the appendix).  
 
PROPOSITION 1. Land allocated to the program crop ( = 1i ) increases with an 
increase in decoupled payments (G ) if 2
1


> , or if 2
1


" < <  and 
1 1 2 >L . On the other hand, land allocated to the program crop decreases 
with an increase in G if 2
1


" < <  and 1 1 2 <L . 
 
Proposition 1 can be economically interpreted as follows. An increase in 
decoupled payments improves farmers’ wealth which in turn increases their 
willingness to assume more risk. This could reduce the attractiveness of crop mix 
diversification as a strategy to manage farm income risk. This will only occur if 
yield correlation is negative or takes low positive values, and if an increase in 
program crop production substantially reduces the profit ( T ) variance. 
Otherwise diversification will not be pursued. 
 
PROPOSITION 2. For a negative value of the mean effect of production, land 
allocated to the program crop decreases with an increase in 1p if 0 < and 
1 2
1
1 1
  
>
 
L
p p
, if 1
2
0 

< < , or if 1
2


> and 1 21
1 1
  
<
 
L
p p
. Otherwise, 
land allocated to crop 1 only decreases if the mean effect outweighs the risk 
effect. 
Page 21 of 43
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
13
The economic meaning of proposition 2 can be expressed as follows. If the 
expected mean effect of production is negative, an increase in 1p only motivates 
an increase in 1L if this increase involves some gains in terms of risk 
management that outweigh the negative mean effect. If yields are negatively 
correlated, the gains in terms of risk management require a substantial reduction 
in the marginal variance of profit. However, if yields are highly and positively 
correlated (and thus diversification towards 2L is less attractive) a small increase 
in the marginal variance is tolerated, as long as the risk effect is of bigger 
magnitude than the mean effect. 
 
PROPOSITION 3. For a positive value of the mean effect of production, land 
allocated to the program crop increases with an increase in 1p if 0 < and 
1 2
1
1 1
  
<
 
L
p p
, or if 1
2


> and 1 21
1 1
  
>
 
L
p p
. Otherwise, land allocated to 
crop 1 only increases if the mean effect outweighs the risk effect. 
 
Proposition 3 thus shows that, because the expected mean effect is positive, no 
diversification in favour of non-program crops is pursued if yield correlation is 
high and positive. However, if 0 < an increase in 1L requires an important 
reduction in the marginal variance of profit. 
In order to assess the effects of decoupling on idle land, we now consider 
a model that examines the allocation of land among program crop production and 
set aside. In such a model, the first order condition in (3) changes to (4) below: 
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21
1 1 0

 =RL
A
(4) 
 
Comparative statics allow to formulate the following two propositions: 
 
PROPOSITION 4. Idle land is reduced with an increase in decoupled payments. 
 
This is due to the fact that an increase in decoupled payments reduces farmers’ 
degree of risk aversion increasing their willingness to assume more risk. Given 
that idle land involves no risk, this alternative becomes less attractive in favour 
of producing agricultural commodities.  
 
PROPOSITION 5. For a negative value of the mean effect of production, idle 
land increases with an increase in 1p to the detriment of 1L . However, if the 
mean effect of production is positive, idle land only increases if the risk effect 
outweighs the mean effect.  
In a situation where the mean effect of production is positive, farmers have the 
incentive to increase the amount of land allocated to program crops to the 
detriment of idle land, as long as the increase in production risk measured as a 
certainty equivalent does not outweigh the mean effect. However, if the mean 
effect is negative, an increase in 1p reduces program crop land in favour of idle 
land. 
 In summary, our comparative statics analysis shows that decoupled 
payments have the effect of reducing idle land. In contrast, the reduction in 
Page 23 of 43
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
15
program crop price supports can motivate land set aside. Decoupled payments 
can also stimulate a change in crop mix in favour of non-program commodities. 
This shift requires yield correlation to be negative or take low positive values. A 
decrease in program crop price supports can also boost non-program crops 
acreage under certain conditions. It is relevant to note that, with the exception of 
the influence of decoupled payments on idle land, the net effects of decoupling 
depend on issues such as yield correlation, changes in the variance of profit, or 
the magnitude of the  mean and risk production effects. This causes the response 
to a decoupled program to be inconclusive making it necessary to determine it 
empirically.  
 
III. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
 
As explained above, our empirical application is focused on the analysis of the 
effects of the US agricultural policy reforms in 1996 on land allocation decisions 
made by a sample of Kansas farms. Specifically, we are interested in observing 
how the planting flexibility provisions and the decoupling of farm income 
support influenced Kansas farms’ land use.  
 Farm-level data are taken from farm account records from the Kansas 
Farm Management Association database for the period 1998 to 2001. 
Retrospective data for these farms are also used to define some lagged variables 
used in the application.10 The Kansas Farm Management Association database 
collects information from individual farms on an annual basis through a 
 
10 To be able to do so, a complete panel of data is built out of our sample. 
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cooperative record-sharing, farm management, and tax preparation arrangement. 
Around 2,500 full-time commercial holdings with gross sales exceeding 
$100,000 provide data to this database. Various farm types and areas in Kansas 
are represented in the dataset (Albright, 2001). The variables in the database 
include, among other information, farm financial and production data, balance 
sheet, cash flow and income statements. Our analysis is based on farm-level data, 
but aggregates are also used to define important variables that are unavailable in 
the farm-level dataset. These aggregates are taken from the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service (NASS). USDA provided state-level PFC payment rates and NASS 
facilitated country-level price indices and state-level output prices and quantities.  
 Table 1 contains summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. 
Following our model specification, we consider a variable input x that includes 
the per acre application of herbicides and fertilizer, representing the main 
variable costs for the farms in the sample. Because input prices are not available 
from the Kansas database, we define w as a country-level input price index. 
Variable x is then defined as an implicit quantity index and derived through the 
ratio of input use in currency units to the corresponding price index. The Kansas 
dataset does not provide information on the consumption of variable inputs by 
crop. We use Just et al. (1990) behavioural proposal to allocate variable input use 
among different crops. The behavioral approach is based upon the assumption 
that farmers behave as if their production functions are characterized by constant 
returns to scale with fixed input/land ratios. Allowing for modifications for 
seasonal and farm-specific conditions, these fixed proportions are assumed to be 
based on regional averages. The only necessary data for implementing this 
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procedure are records on land allocation by crop, purchases by input and sales by 
output. Just et al. (1990) show the validity of the behavioral approach and its 
superiority to other alternative approaches.11 
Two output categories are distinguished as quantity indices per acre ( 1y
and 2y ). Variable 1y represents program crops and includes the production of 
wheat, corn, and grain sorghum per acre. Variable 2y is the production of 
soybeans representing a non-program commodity. Together, wheat, corn, 
sorghum and soybeans represent the main crops in Kansas. Paasche indices for 
both crops are computed using state-level output prices and production to define 
1p and 2p .
Crop rotation, which we do not observe, is a relevant practice in Kansas 
with much benefit from using program crops in rotation with non-program crops. 
As explained above, apart from economic and policy issues, land use can also be 
affected by crop rotation. According to Dumler and Duncan (2005)12 the passage 
of the 1996 FAIR Act may have favored rotation of program with non-program 
crops such as soybeans, without losing program payments. From this perspective, 
rotation issues would be an added reason to switch from program crops to 
soybeans or idle land. However, as noted above, the value of rotating non-
program with program crops may have been reduced with the decline in program 
crop prices. In other words, any increase in soybeans production is more likely to 
 
11 We should note here that another allocation mechanism based on profit maximization was also 
used, but yielded inconsistent results. This is not surprising in light of Just et al. (1990) findings 
that the behavioural method is superior.  
12 Halloran (2006), on the other hand, finds that for potato cropping systems, rotating program 
with non-program crops can improve economic viability and reduce risk. 
Page 26 of 43
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
18
have been driven by a change in relative market prices than by agronomic 
reasons. As a result, the overall impacts are not likely to have been very relevant. 
 iA represents land allocated to alternative 1,2i = ,3, with A representing 
total crop acres, 3A the acres left idle, and 1A and 2A the crop acres planted to 
program and non-program crops respectively. By using iy , ix , ip , w , the value 
for i can be determined. Computing quasi rents at the farm-level involves 
some problems. First, not every farm produces crop i 13 every year and when this 
happens i cannot be determined at the farm-level. Second, the composition of 
1y can vary annually within a farm as land planted to wheat, corn and sorghum 
changes, which complicates the definition of a reasonable value for 1 at the 
farm-level. In light of these problems, we define quasi rents using annual sample-
means for the production and input consumption variables.14 
Kansas database does not register PFC government payments. Instead, a 
single measure including all government payments received by each farm is 
available. To derive an estimate of farm-level PFC payments, the acreage of 
program crops (base acreage) and the base yield for each crop are approximated 
using farm-level data. The approximation uses the 1986-88 average acreage and 
yield for each program crop and farm. PFC payments per crop are derived by 
 
13 The problem applies to crop 2i = .
14 It is important to note here that other alternatives were also considered, including the use of 
farm-level i values whenever possible (and averages otherwise), or the use of the Kansas 
Farm Management Association crop budgets (http://www.agmanager.info/crops/). However, 
these alternatives yielded results in contrast to widely accepted previous research results and thus 
were discarded. 
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multiplying 0.85 by the base acreage, yield, and the PFC payment rate. PFC 
payments per crop are then added to get total direct payments per farm.15 A 
farm’s initial wealth is defined as the farm’s net worth. 
 In order to achieve the aforementioned objectives, the following system 
of first-order conditions is estimated using two-stage nonlinear least squares: 
 
( ) ( ){ }( )1 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 2var( ) var( ) 2cov( , ) (1 ) cov( , ) var( ) 0W L LA
 
 
  +     +      =
(5.1) 
( ) ( ){ }2 1 1 2 2 3 2cov( , ) var( ) (1 ) var( ) 0W L LA
      +     = (5.2) 
 
IV. RESULTS 
 
Table 1 shows that, during the period studied, more than 62% of crop land was 
planted to program crops, 26% was devoted to non-program commodities, and 
12% was left idle. Sample means also show that estimated PFC payments 
represent around 1.8% of farmers’ initial wealth. Of interest is the fact that, for 
the period of analysis, the expected market profit per acre derived from non-
program commodities outweighs the one obtained from program crops.  Also, 
during the period of study, 2 1var var( ) ( ) >  , which involves higher income risk 
 
15 This estimate is compared to actual government payments received by each farm. If estimated 
PFC payments exceed actual payments, the first measure is replaced by the second.  
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derived from non-program crops.16 Two-stage nonlinear least squares parameter 
estimates for the system of first-order conditions (see table 2) provide evidence 
that farmers in our sample are risk averse, and that the degree of risk aversion 
decreases with farmers’ wealth, i.e., farmers exhibit DARA preferences.  
Price, cross-price and payment elasticities of the proportion of land 
planted to program and non-program crops or left idle are presented in table 3. 
As expected, results suggest that an increase in its own price increases the 
quantity of land planted to program crops. Quite the opposite, the price elasticity 
of non-program crops is negative. This result is not surprising given the high 
income risk associated with 2y during the period of analysis. An increase in 2p
does not only involve an increase in mean income, but also a substantial increase 
in income variance. This lays out the necessary conditions for a failure in the 
‘law of supply’, that contends that the quantity supplied by price-taking 
producers will rise in response to an increase in output prices. An increase in 
profit risk above the increase in its mean will originate this failure. This result is 
in accord with the findings of Just and Zilberman (1986). Results indicate that 
cross-price effects are negative for program crop and positive for non-program 
crop prices. Hence, a decline in program crop deficiency payments motivates a 
change in land use away from program crops in favour of non-program 
commodities. In contrast, farmers will respond to an increase in non-program 
crop prices by increasing land devoted to other uses such as program crops. The 
response of idle land to changes to market prices is quite different depending on 
whether it is the program or the non-program crop price that is changed. An 
 
16 Differences in the variance of profits might partly reflect the fact that 1y is a composite output, 
and 2y is a single crop. 
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increase in program crop prices creates a strong incentive to reduce idle land to 
plant program commodities.17 This shift in land use takes place because the 
increase in mean income originated by the increase in 1p outweighs the increase 
in income risk. However, an increase in 2p does not reduce idle land. Instead 
idle acreage is increased. As noted before, the high risk associated to the 
production of 2y for the period studied is increased with an increase in the output 
price. The relevance of the risk effect relative to the mean effect motivates 
farmers to set some land aside. Land use is also sensitive to government 
subsidies. An increase in decoupled payments reduces farmers’ degree of risk 
aversion and stimulates undertaking risky activities. This involves a reduction in 
idle land in favour of crop land planted to both program and non-program 
commodities.  
 Hence, our results show that agricultural policy decoupling is likely to 
have motivated a change in farmers’ crop mix. The extremely low values of 
subsidy elasticities relative to price elasticities allow to predict a reduction in the 
acreage planted to program crops in favour of non-program commodities and idle 
land. In order to better show the utility of our model, we carry out a simulation 
exercise that assesses the effects of shocking the model in accordance with the 
policy changes occurred during the period studied. During this period, marketing 
assistance loan rates declined approximately by 6.4%, while deficiency payments 
were cut by almost 29%. We assume the reduction in marketing assistance loan 
rates to be fully incorporated into the output prices received by farmers. As a 
result of the decline in program crop prices, our simulations suggest a reduction 
in program crop land on the order of 12% in favour of non-program crops, that 
 
17 High idle land elasticities are partly due to the low initial values of this variable. 
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increase their area by 13%, and idle land, that is augmented by 35%. The low 
elasticity values of decoupled payments involve small changes in land allocation 
as a result of a change in PFC payments. Both program and non-program crop 
acres increase by less than 0.2%, while idle land is reduced by 1.3%. As a result 
of these changes, the new land allocation vector at the data means is 1 0.55L = ,
2 0.29L = , and 3 0.16L = .
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper investigates the effects of decoupling on farmers’ land allocation 
decisions and, specifically, on the crop mix and idle land. Coupled policies 
usually restrict farmers’ capacity to respond to market conditions by imposing 
restrictive supply management rules. In this regard, decoupling involves 
increased planting flexibility and thus may motivate changes in land allocation. 
Other aspects of decoupling can also influence land allocation decisions. These 
aspects are the reduction in price supports for program crops and their 
replacement by lump sum transfers, which are likely to involve changes in 
relative market prices and in farmers’ risk attitudes. 
 In order to show how these policy reforms could affect land use, we use 
an extended version of the Just and Zilberman (1986) model of production under 
uncertainty. Our model offers an improved picture of farmers’ behaviour by 
allowing to optimize land allocation in response to policy and by considering 
land idling among land use alternatives. Theoretical results show that, under the 
assumption of DARA preferences, an increase in lump sum transfers will 
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increase farmers’ willingness to assume more risk. This could reduce the 
attractiveness of crop mix diversification away from program crops and in favour 
of non-program commodities as a strategy to manage farm income risk. This 
involves that this diversification will only be pursued if yield correlation between 
program and non-program crops is negative or takes low positive values, and if 
an increase in land allocated to program crops involves a substantial reduction in 
the profit variance. Under certain conditions of yield correlation, profit variance 
and mean income, a decrease in program crop price supports will motivate 
diversification away from these crops. Idle land will decrease as a result of a 
reduction in program crop prices, only if the mean effect of production is 
negative or if it is positive and the risk effect outweighs the mean effect. An 
increase in decoupled subsidies will motivate farmers to assume riskier 
enterprises and reduce uncultivated land.  
 We use farm-level data collected in Kansas to illustrate our model and 
determine the effects of the FAIR Act on crop mix diversification. Our results 
show that decoupling may induce a change in farmers’ crop mix by stimulating 
to reduce program crop acres in favour of non-program commodities and land 
idling.  
 Our work represents a first step in the analysis of the impacts of 
decoupling on land allocation. Our empirical analysis is however constrained by 
data availability. Due to data restrictions, we are not able to assess the role of 
agronomic restrictions such as crop rotation issues on land use, which constitutes 
a promising extension of our work. Another future line of inquiry would involve 
the consideration of the influence of land quality on land allocation decisions. 
The collection of data on farmers’ expectations about future policy benefits 
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would allow an evaluation of the effects of policy expectations on land use and 
constitutes another possible extension of our analysis. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Proof of proposition 1. By totally differentiating equation (3), the following 
expression can be derived: 
 
[ ]1 1 1 2
1   =  +
 
L R L
G D W
(6) 
 
where 0D > is the negative value of the second order condition of the 
optimization problem. If crop yields are negatively correlated (i.e. 0 < ), 
2 0 < , which involves that 1 0

>

L
G
if 1 1 2 >L . If the correlation coefficient 
is positive (i.e. 0 > ), 2 ( )0 > < if  2
1
( )

> < . We can thus conclude that if 
2
1
0 

< <  and 1 1 2( ) > <L , then 1 ( )0
L
G

> <

. Otherwise, if 2
1


> , land 
allocated to program crops will increase with an increase in decoupled payments 
1 0L
G
 >  
.
Proof of proposition 2. By totally differentiating equation (3), the following 
expression can be derived: 
 
( )1 1 21 1 1 2
1_
1 1 1
1  
       
=   +	 
 	 
    	 
   
R W
LL y R L
p D A W D p p
(7) 
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where 
( )1 1 2
1 _
1 
  
	 

	 
 
R W
L
y
A W
 represents the mean effect of production per 
unit of land, being 1 21
1 1
    
+	 
    
R L
p p
the variance effect discounted to a 
certainty equivalent using the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion. 
Expression 1
1

p
represents the marginal variance of the marginal profit, and 
2
1

p
stands for a half of the change in the marginal variance of profit when 
1 0L = . The elasticity _ 0R W
R W
W R
 = <

represents the wealth elasticity of the 
Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion. 
 If yield correlation coefficient is negative ( 0 < ), then 1
1
0 >
p
and 
2
1
0 <
p
, i.e., the variance of the marginal profit increases, but the marginal 
variance of profit decreases. In such a situation, the sign of the marginal risk 
effect is positive if  1 21
1 1
  
>
 
L
p p
which involves 1
1
0 <

L
p
. Otherwise, the 
marginal effect is negative and the sign of 1
1
L
p


depends on the magnitude of the 
mean effect relative to the marginal effect. If yield correlation is positive, then 
1
1
( )0 > <
p
if 1
2
( )

< >  and 2
1
0 >
p
. This involves that if 1
2


> and 
1 2
1
1 1
  
<
 
L
p p
, or if 1
2
0 

< < , then 1
1
0L
p

<

.
Proof of proposition 3. See proof of proposition 2.  
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Proof of proposition 4. By totally differentiating equation (4), the following 
expression can be derived: 
 
2
1 1 1 0 =  >
 
L L R
G D W
(8) 
 
Proof of proposition 5. By totally differentiating equation (4), the following 
expression can be derived: 
 
21 1 1 1
1 1 1
1
1 2R
dL y L R L p
dp D A W D
     =  	 
   
 (9) 
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Table 1. Summary statistics for the variables of interest 
Variable Mean 
(Standard deviation)
n= 2,241 
1y (USD/acre) 
Program crop yields 
106.54 
(11.51) 
2y (USD/acre) 
Non-program crop yields 
 118.74 
(27.85) 
1x (USD/acre) 
Variable input allocated to program crops 
39.32 
(1.48) 
2x (USD/acre) 
Variable input allocated to non-program crops
28.17 
(1.49) 
1p (1998=1.00) 
Program crop price index 
1.01 
 (0.06) 
2p (1998=1.00) 
Non-program crop price index 
0.91 
 (0.06) 
w (1998=100) 
Variable input price index 
 1.02 
(0.03) 
1 (USD/acre) 
Program crop quasi rents 
 67.55  
(7.07) 
2 (USD/acre) 
Non-program crop quasi rents 
79.61 
 (6.58) 
Note: all monetary values are expressed in constant 1998 currency units 
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Table 1. Summary statistics for the variables of interest 
Variable Mean 
(Standard deviation) 
n= 2,241 
1var( )
Variance of program crop quasi rents 
 180.81 
 (22.43) 
2var( )
Variance of non-program crop quasi rents 
861.61 
 (111.13) 
1 2cov( ) 
Quasi rents’ covariance 
268.39 
(18.76) 
0W (USD) 
Farm’s initial wealth 
669,663.10 
(587,319.18) 
G (USD) 
Production Flexibility Contract Payments 
12,014.92 
 (9,233.03) 
1L
Proportion of land allocated to program crops 
0.62 
(0.23) 
2L
Proportion of land allocated to non-program 
crops 
0.26 
(0.24) 
3L
Proportion of land left idle 
0.12 
(0.18) 
A (acres) 
Total crop land 
1075.90  
(827.46) 
Note: all monetary values are expressed in constant 1998 currency units 
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Table 2. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for the coefficients of risk 
aversion 
Parameter Mean predicted 
value 
(Standard 
deviation) 
 0.034** 
(0.007) 
 -0.353** 
(0.017) 
F-test ( 0 = and 0 = ) 23,603** 
Note: Two asterisks (**) denote statistical significance at the T = 0.05 level 
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Table 3. Elasticity estimates  
Elasticity Mean value 
(Standard deviation)
1 1_L p

1.9132** 
(0.1722) 
2 1_L p

-2.0844** 
(0.1217) 
3 1_L p

-5.5302** 
(0.6439) 
1 2_L p

0.1668** 
(0.0517) 
2 2_L p

-1.2794** 
(0.0816) 
3 2_L p

1.9433** 
(0.0934) 
1 _L G

0.0064** 
(0.0003) 
2 _L G

0.0055** 
(0.0003) 
3 _L G

-0.0460** 
(0.0024) 
Note: (**) denotes statistical significance at the T = 0.05 level 
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